How to win the greatest ‘game’ of all

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This month’s essay (May, 2026) follows below . . .

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Analysis of strategy in modern warfare starts with Napoleon’s innovations and Clausewitz’s insights. Clausewitz’s treatise On War (1832) was so compelling that many strategists have had difficulty in thinking outside the framework he established, emphasizing the interactions among politics, violence, and chance.

Colin Gray is a modern writer who noted the dearth of impressive strategists over the last 100 years. He suggested that there aren’t many military leaders comfortable with theory, nor civilian theorists competent in practice. In Gray’s 1999 book, Modern Strategy, he insists that the proficient strategist must view systems holistically, taking into account seventeen factors including society, culture, politics, ethics, economics, technology, chance, and time.

A professor at the U.S. Army War College went further, that the strategist must enjoy a “comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening within the strategic environment and the potential first-, second-, and third-order effects of his own choices on the efforts of those above, below, and on the strategist’s own level.”

Whew! Sounds daunting, overwhelming, in fact . . . impossible. Accordingly, perhaps luck, ‘fate’, or at least on the grand scale, God’s will actually determines outcomes. I’m mindful of an early battle in Napoleon’s career in which a cannonball bounced madly through the field and killed the officer standing next to the young general. If the path were shifted by two feet, no one today would know the name of the most celebrated Corsican in history.

Despite the intimidating depth and breadth of the subject, Lawrence Freedman’s 2013 book, Strategy, makes a serious effort to encapsulate the history and principles relevant to war, politics, and business. He does the job admirably, in my opinion. Let’s pull some nuggets out. At the end I’ll comment on how God’s strategy (biblically) for Christians in this age transcends the wisdom of this world.

My opening paragraphs above reflect the realism Freedman embraces on the complexities of strategies for large causes. He admits that brilliant, or even truly competent strategy necessitates near omniscience – “The idea of a master strategist is therefore a myth.” However, real life demands an attempt at strategy, somehow prioritizing the issues and actions required in the near term, and bringing together people and resources to begin to make progress toward, perhaps, a distant goal.

Freedman argues that the modern focus on strategic thinking and plans derives from the optimism of the Enlightenment, that reason, analysis, and even mathematics might overcome the vagaries of human whims and emotion in designing and predicting successful outcomes. Yet life is complex, and humans are stubborn, not generally rational; human institutions, especially, may be impervious to change.

Leo Tolstoy, a pessimist, “dismissed the idea of strategy as presumptuous and naïve.” Rejecting the idea that history is full of lessons, Gordon Wood argued that only one counted: “Nothing ever works out quite the way its managers intended or expected.” Furthermore, that history taught “skepticism about people’s ability to manipulate and control purposely their own destinies.” Mostly, it could be said that useful strategies are ways of coping with situations where nobody is really in control.

So, what’s the point of strategy? President Eisenhower, with vast military experience at the highest strategic levels insisted, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.” The act of planning sensitizes the commander or CEO to the signals of a changing situation, and helps him to adapt more quickly. The strategy had a goal in mind; that goal may still be achievable, although circumstances change dramatically.

Freedman magnifies the importance of language and communication in executing a successful strategy. Persuasion is essential to get others to follow, and to follow in the right direction. Pericles’ authority was enhanced by his rhetorical ability in his democratic environment. Machiavelli exhorted princes to make effective arguments. Churchill’s speeches lifted morale and hope and gave the British people a purpose in their suffering.

At the very beginning of time, Freedman notes, God created strategy by allowing choice. Freedman does a nice job of summarizing strategies in Scripture – Satan chose deceit to initiate the Fall of man, God chose coercion to induce Pharaoh to let the Israelites leave Egypt, David rejected advice and chose his favorite weapons and garb to battle Goliath. The fundamental lesson throughout Scripture, Freedman observes, is that the best and only strategy is to obey God and do as He tells you.

Sadly, Freedman also devotes a chapter to evolution as if that fantasy and biblical history could inhabit the same universe. Positively, though, most of his chapter on evolution discusses modern observations (Jane Goodall) of survival and dominance strategies among chimpanzees. For example, aggression is not always preferred if simple demonstrations of superiority suffice; coalitions form over mutual interests; deceit is employed, and so on. Freedman concludes that whether in chimp or human culture, the elements of strategic behavior don’t change, rather the complexity depends on the situation.

From chimpanzees and the Bible to the Greeks, we see in Homer the strength of Achilles contrasted with the cunning of Odysseus; with Machiavelli the key qualities are force and guile. Those that prioritize guile, like Odysseus, see the ends as justifying the means. It’s results that count!

Those skilled in trickery and deceit may have advantages in fluid, fast moving situations, where adaptation is needed to come out on top. Anyone can see where such moral ambiguity plays into warfare, politics, and business, but I would mention here that – Of course! – it should have no part in evangelism. Yet most of those (relatively few) Christians in America who have some zeal for personal evangelism were trained on the ‘Romans Road’ approach, which is manipulative, simplistic, and terminates in a so-called (and unscriptural) ‘sinner’s prayer’ and a declaration that the sinner is hereby saved. I’ve written much on this subject, especially in my Evangelism book you can download from the free ebookstore on this site. The Romans Road strategy includes avoidance of questions, utter neglect of the vital doctrine of repentance, and a transparent high pressure sales technique to push through to ‘closing the deal.’ But you cannot trick or manipulate someone into salvation. There must be genuine understanding, sincere repentance, and an informed faith for a real conversion.

Freedman’s discussion of the historian Thucydides seems correlated with the Trump Derangement Syndrome rampant in American political media over the last decade. Ate, the daughter of Eris (goddess of strife), induced stupidity in both mortals and immortals. She worked to render her victims “incapable of rational choice.” But Zeus declares that the folly of humans is not caused by the gods but by the “blindness of their own hearts.” It’s not fate, but bad strategy that leads to disaster.

In the 1st century A.D. the Roman, Valerius Maximus, wrote positively of not-so-truthful strategems, such as using a white lie to lift morale – like persuading one of your battalions to advance because its sister battalion was making good progress (it need not be true). Or sending a false refugee to corrupt the enemy from within. Or maneuvering to convince your enemy that you intend to attack here, while you actually send twice that force to attack there. Such Roman writings persisted long enough to influence Machiavelli’s writings.

Of course Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is the venerable classic on strategy, dating from about 500 B.C. Its wisdom touched statecraft in addition to warfare. Its principles include: Excellence does not come from winning 100 victories in 100 battles; rather it is better “to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Sun Tzu prioritized deception, recommending force only when necessary, and then, “Avoid what is strong to strike what is weak.”

This is certainly Satan’s strategy, targeting both sinners and saints when weakest. He reserved his most poignant temptations for the end of Jesus’ forty days of prayer and fasting in the wilderness. So, watch out for temptations in the midst of troublous times.

The biblical strategy for evangelism is the antithesis of Sun Tzu. Put the issues on the table and examine them clearly. Use the law to convict the conscience. Describe the Gospel clearly as a free offer for forgiveness. If the lost sinner clearly understands the message and rejects it, then it’s on his head. The Christian’s job is to love enough to warn clearly. See Ezekiel 3:17-19.

Sun Tzu delivered timeless political strategy, observing that you might drive a wedge between a sovereign and his ministers. Sow seeds of suspicion to drive allies away from the enemy’s leader. Certainly, Satan works against churches in this way, as do social and news media against their political foes.

Sun Tzu warned that deception can go only so far, especially if the enemy is following the same principles. Confusion might overcome your own followers if they cannot tell what you really believe.

Machiavelli was fascinated with the challenge of defeating a stronger opponent. He accepted that there would certainly be risks; therefore, there is no ‘safe’ course. As Thomas Sowell’s economic dictum goes, “There are no solutions; only tradeoffs.” In Machiavelli’s words, “You can never try to escape one danger without encountering another; but prudence consists in knowing how to recognize the nature of the different dangers and in accepting the least bad as good.”

I’ve applied these ideas to amateur competitive tennis in my book you can download from this site’s free ebookstore. From experience I learned that I was more likely to beat someone ‘better’ than me if I figured out his most serious weakness and exploited that, rather than just try to play my own game. Of course, your own game must be versatile enough to succeed in exploiting that weakness.

Machiavelli is famous for his moral flexibility. He counseled that you will suffer if you prioritize virtue in word and deed. Rather, he encouraged a public appearance above reproach, while dealing privately in whatever skulduggery that leads to success. His principle was that survival must be the highest objective. Sadly, he did not consider that he would thereby sacrifice the long term for the short. Namely, if God is there and a final judgment is unavoidable, then short term survival or success through evildoing will be undone – horrifically – at the Great White Throne Judgment.

Freedman uses the Oxford English Dictionary to distinguish strategy in war – the art of the commander-in-chief directing large military movements and operations in a campaign – from tactics – the art of handling forces during battle or in the proximity of the enemy. The words have migrated into many areas, including trade, politics, and even theology.

Napoleon would disagree, seeing the art of war as a continuum: It was “all in execution . . . nothing about it is theoretical.” “With a numerically inferior army” the goal is to have “larger forces than the enemy at the point which is to be attacked or defended.” Napoleon believed this to be an art learnable from neither books nor practice. Intuition is key.

I believe the old general deliberately obfuscates, however. I see similarity in the art of program management; for example, a large R&D program with a lot of projects, players, and resources. My experience in that field is that the leader/manager must continually update his awareness on the factors I mentioned in the opening paragraphs, and act decisively to get the short term deeds done that he knows will impact long term success. I’m quite sure that Napoleon was doing exactly that every day of his major campaigns.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1832) learned his warcraft as an officer in the Prussian army that was defeated by Napoleon, but he persevered in both the Russian and Prussian armies to see Napoleon’s ultimate defeat. In one of his most celebrated passages he wrote on the realities of war and the shortcomings of strategic planning:

“Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war . . . Countless minor incidents – the kind you can never really foresee – combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls short of the intended goal.”

In short, friction causes confusion and delay. “All actions take place in something virtually akin to dusk . . . like fog or moonlight.” Everything takes longer than it should. Consider the Russia / Ukraine war – the Russians were sure it would be done in a week, but it grinds on for four years, with 2 million casualties.

Clausewitz was gloomy about the unreliability of intelligence, so much so that he discounted its value almost completely. It occurs to me that in the spiritual war associated with the Great Commission, our ‘intelligence’ is rather pitiful, but we need not care. The Lord knows exactly what’s going on and our job is simply to obey His commands and be sensitive to His leadings. An often observed exegesis of Ephesians chapter 6 notes that the spiritual armor we don completely neglects rearward defense. The Lord has our back; our mission is to relentlessly move forward, sharing the Gospel, speaking truth, loving, helping, doing.

Clausewitz saw competing armies as rather similar in competence, so size matters. “The skill of the greatest commanders may be counterbalanced by a two-to-one ratio in the fighting forces.” Does this apply to the spiritual war? Indeed. Jesus tells us to pray for more laborers (soldiers) to work the harvest field (Matthew 9:38). Philippians 1:12-18 indicates that Christian laborers don’t have to be perfect to accomplish much.

The 1870 Franco-Prussian War allowed a Clausewitz disciple to extend the strategist’s art. Field Marshal Helmut Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke coined the expression, “No plan survives contact with the enemy.” Accordingly, he refused to be locked into any system or grand plan. War “cannot be conducted on a green table!” and so he delegated authority to subordinate commanders so they could respond to fluid situations. Yet the overall objective must be clearly in view of all officers.

This is certainly the modern American model for conducting war, whenever political leaders allow it. Our operations in Vietnam suffered because of continual meddling from Washington, D.C.

Von Moltke taught that “Only victory breaks the enemy will and compels him to submit to our own. Neither the occupation of territory nor the capturing of fortified places, but only the destruction of the enemy fighting-power will, as a rule, decide.”

This principle is fundamental to the changes by President Trump and Secretary Hegseth in revamping the lumbering, bureaucratic Dept. of Defense into a warwinning-focused War Department. Avoid war when you can, let the diplomats and industrialists create ways to promote peace, but when war must come, then win decisively and quickly. Our ugly 20-year experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan produced compelling arguments to hearken back to the 19th century principles espoused by Clausewitz and von Moltke.

Modern western Christendom suffers from the same maladies. Churches strive for size, for a multiplicity of programs, for money, facilities, and staff. But the mission is the Great Commission. We ought to be about that work.

Freedman has a nice description of the impact of John Boyd, an Air Force fighter pilot of the late 20th century who reframed fighter tactics via the “OODA loop.” Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. Then repeat, since your action changes the situation. The fighter pilot wants to get to “Act” before his opponent, namely, to pull the trigger. “Boyd felt the OODA loop applied to any situation in which it was necessary to keep or gain the initiative.” The aim is to disorient the opponent, to stay on offense, and to win.

OODA thinking clearly applies generally to competitive scenarios, including product development and launch in business, winning points in tennis, and executing a game-winning touchdown drive before the clock runs out. I see its application to apologetics and evangelism, especially presuppositional apologetics in which you make clear that the biblical worldview is the most powerful, even the only explanatory foundation for the truth about the physical universe, man and his foibles, his dreams, and the Gospel as his only hope.

Against the lost skeptic (or rather FOR his benefit) the ‘game’ is to play offense, not to win an argument, but rather to derail the arrogant ignorance of the materialist. Insist that he must play defense, to defend what ultimately is indefensible. Out of compassion, drive him away from his lost equilibrium. See my essays on Cornelius Van Til in the Evangelism section of this site.

In politics, Freedman notes, Karl Marx espoused a theory of revolution, as Clausewitz had offered a theory of war. Marx’s disadvantage was that he theorized prior to any experience of the revolutions he prophesied.

For Marx’s ideas of class struggle to work, class had to be more than a statistical social or economic category, but rather a self-aware identity that yearns to upend the current system. The Democrat Party’s relentless identity politics of the last generation is part of Marx’s playbook. He would be disappointed, though, that today’s Communist Party (Democrat) has to work so hard to convince its supporters that they only exist as members of narrowly-defined identities: black, alphabet, anything-but-male/Christian/heterosexual.

Marx saw the necessity of undermining the competing forces of nation and religion, which always has been a hard sell, yet the fight continues today. Marx’s buddy Engels also lamented in the 19th century what we see today . . . the woke tend to be wimps, “invariably full of bluster and loud protestations, but faint-hearted, cautious, and calculating” in the face of danger and then “aghast, alarmed, and wavering” when matters become serious.

Marx was a historical determinist. He believed the revolution was inevitable and would proceed in the capitalist/industrial West in stages. The Bolshevik revolution, in contrast, occurred in a non-industrial, feudal Russia. It didn’t happen in the West. Lenin and his followers (Stalin, Mao, Castro) were far more impatient than Marx. They schemed to take power in the immediate term. Today’s leftists follow in that line. They want it all now, so any tactic – ala Machiavelli, is considered.

Saul Alinsky, a hero to Barack Obama, was a labor activist trained in sociology at the University of Chicago. His book Rules for Radicals, became a bible for the radical 1960s. His rules included:

• If your numbers are small, hide that fact and raise a ruckus so people think you are far more influential. • Keep your own people comfortable, but sow fear and confusion in the camp of your opponents. • Don’t argue – Ridicule! That’s much harder to defend against. • Keep the pressure on your opponent. • Threats terrify more than reality. • “Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, polarize it.”

It’s easy to see these principles play out in modern American politics. It’s also clear that Alinsky was well-tuned to Satanic principles that have worked for thousands of years.

Let’s turn to business. Freedman sees management as “more than administration but less than total control, requiring persuasive or manipulative as well as coercive skills, a flair for extracting more from a person, organization, or situation than might have otherwise been expected.” The more complex the organization, the more that managers would be relied upon. “Effective power began to rest with those who actually understood the issues.”

In my first Air Force assignment as a new 2nd Lieutenant, I studied the local org chart to guide me as I worked to succeed in project management. I recall discovering, though, that there was an invisible structure, with key people in just the right positions, that could actually help me get things done. These key people were ‘experts’ who did not necessarily sit in the formal org chart’s key positions.

Freedman relates some of the history of the auto industry. Henry Ford took the dominant lead in the market, aiming for a universal car that would suit everyone’s needs. General Motors grew through the acquisition of small companies. GM became unwieldy and heavy in debt; when the DuPont family bought the company they hired Alfred P. Sloan, who restructured the new corporation into independent divisions, yet with some commonly shared functions to be managed by corporate HQ. The tension he had to manage was, as Sloan’s biographer wrote, “a new kind of corporate music, a symphony of controlled, decentralized production, operation, and administration in which there is a reward for the virtuoso performer and regard for the conductor.”

Ford was stubborn and ruled top-down autocratically. GM turned out to be flexible, and agile, offering a full range of vehicles from luxury class to utilitarian basic. GM came out on top.

Freedman describes how, in the late 20th century, books on how to succeed in business often made use of military strategy metaphors. Sun Tzu’s book became immensely popular because it was endorsed by the fictional mob boss, Tony Soprano. Tony thanked his psychiatrist, “Been reading that – that book you told me about. You know, The Art of War, by Sun Tzu. I mean here’s this guy, a Chinese general, wrote this thing 2400 years ago, and most of it still applies today! Balk the enemy’s power. Force him to reveal himself.”

Business strategists and even self-help books began to apply Sun Tzu and other historical strategists to their own disciplines. Freedman concludes that there was little useful impact in these literary adventures. “The real skill was in creating new products and developing new services – even new markets that the most likely competitors had missed.” The military metaphors were usually clever ways to say the obvious. Real success required real creativity and skill.

The late 20th century saw a plethora of strategic gurus and techniques that mostly didn’t change much, except enrich the authors and consultants. One way to summarize what counts in leadership and manager-ship is that character counts, worldview counts, along with values, creativity, and diligence. Timeless stuff.

I’ll conclude here with a few more comments about the ultimate ‘game’, the Great Commission – embracing both evangelism and discipleship – and the strategy God has given us for His work.

God’s strategy for us is delightfully simple. Go and preach the Gospel to everyone (Mk 16:15-16). Baptize and teach those who respond. Befriend, encourage, and train new believers to go and do likewise. Jesus promises to be with us in this endeavor until He returns (Matt 28:18-20). He’s got our back and tells us how to equip ourselves for our part in the fight (Ephesians 6, Jude 24, Rom 8:35-39). He’ll do the hard work (1 John 4:4). Our part is to plod along and be faithful (1 Cor 15:58, 2 Peter 1:10). He’ll reward us accordingly upon His return (Rev 22:12).

• drdave@truthreallymatters.com

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